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Introduction
Richard Bloomfield made $424,000 in connection with Plaintiffs' purchase of
securities. At trial, Mr. Bloomfield did not dispute that he made $424,000 from the
transaction or that he was unlicensed to sell securities. The sole issue for the jury to decide
was whether Mr. Bloomfield "offered to sale" the securities Plaintiffs purchased. Plaintiffs
and Mr. Bloomfield disagreed on a proper jury instruction defining the meaning of "sale"
or "offered to sale" for purposes of determining liability under the Utah Securities Act.

Mr. Bloomfield's proposed jury instruction included a list of misleading and
irrelevant factors that the jury was told they "may" consider in deciding whether Mr.
Bloomfield offered or sold the security. Plaintiffs' proposed jury instruction quoted the
definition of"sale" and "offered to sale" straight from the Utah Securities Act's definition.
The trial court adopted all of Mr. Bloomfield's proposed jury instructions and
rejected all of Plaintiffs' proposed jury instructions, without explanation or meaningful oral
argument. Plaintiffs' counsel attempted to ameliorate the damage caused by the trial court's
decision to adopt the erroneous instruction by asking the trial court to add a limiting
statement to the jury instruction.
Given the jury instruction read to the jury, it was no surprise to anyone that the jury
found that Mr. Bloomfield did not sale or offer to sale a security to Plaintiffs.

{00024676 1 }
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Argument

Mr. Bloomfield makes four arguments in opposition to Plaintiffs' appeal of the trial
court's decision to erroneously instruct the jury on the definition of sale or offer to sale
under the Utah Securities Act: (1) that the standard of review is abuse of discretion, (2)
Plaintiffs failed to preserve the issue by attempting to ameliorate the harm caused by the
trial court's error, (3) that the jury instruction was not error, and (4) Plaintiffs suffered no
prejudice. Plaintiffs address each of these arguments in turn below.
1.

The Standard of Review is For Correctness Because the Trial Court Gave an
Instruction But That Instruction Misstated the Law.
When a jury instruction is given, this Court's review of whether the instruction

correctly states the law presents a question oflaw, which this Court reviews for correctness.

See State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, ,r 13, 193 P.3d 92 ("Whether a jury instruction correctly
states the law presents a question of law which we review for correctness."). "Challenges
to jury instructions require interpretations of law; therefore, we review them for
correctness." Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66,

,r 22, 221

P .3d

256. In applying this standard, the reviewing court gives no deference to the district court.

See State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, ,r 16,243 P.3d 1250.

Mr. Bloomfield argues the standard is abuse of discretion but cites to cases applying
an abuse of discretion standard when a trial court refuses to give an instruction. See
Bloomfield Reply Brief, 38 (quoting Miller v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2012 UT 54,

,r 13

285 P.3d 1208 (noting that the issue presented in that case was "a district court's refusal to
give a jury instruction").

{00024676 1 }
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Here, a jury instruction was given. This is not a case in which the district court
refused to give an instruction. Instead, the issue in this case is whether the jury instruction
that was given correctly states the law. Accordingly, the standard of review is for
correctness.

2.

Plaintiffs Preserved Their Objection to the Jury Instruction by Making a
Written Objection and Submitting a Proposed Alternative Instruction.
2.1

Plaintiffs Objected to the Inclusion of the Irrelevant Factors.

Mr. Bloomfield suggests that Plaintiffs failed to preserve their objections, both legal
and factual, to the erroneous jury instruction even though Plaintiffs submitted a proposed
alternative instruction and submitted a written objection to Mr. Bloomfield's proposed
instruction.

In Plaintiffs' written objection to Mr. Bloomfield's proposed Jury Instruction No.
13, Plaintiffs explain that their proposed jury instruction is consistent with the statutory
definitions of "offer" and "sale" under the Utah Securities Act. R. 6294 (noting that the
language in Plaintiffs' proposed jury instruction "is consistent with the statutory definitions
of an 'offer' and 'sale' under the Utah Uniform Securities Act").
Plaintiffs continued to object by taking issue with Mr. Bloomfield's inclusion of
additional explanations and a list of misleading factors in his proposed jury instruction,
none of which are found in the statutory definition of "offer" or "sale." Plaintiffs stated in
their written objection that the inclusion of a list of misleading and irrelevant factors with
no application to this case erroneously narrows the scope of the legal definitions of offer
and sale under the Utah Securities Act:

{00024676 I }
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The statutory definitions of offer or sale are not intended to be construed so
narrowly and could encompass virtually a limitless number of factors based on the
unique facts and circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it is inappropriate to
include this list of factors in the jury instruction.

R. 6294.
Plaintiffs' objection was clear: Plaintiffs objected to Mr. Bloomfield's proposed jury
instruction because it was legally erroneous in that it narrowed the statutory definition of
the terms "offer" and "sale" by including a list of factors not included in the statutory
definition that had no application to the facts in this case. Further, Plaintiffs' objection to

Mr. Bloomfield's instruction was clear when Plaintiffs submitted an alternative instruction
that tracked the statutory definitions of "offer" and "sale" and asked the court to adopt
Plaintiffs' instruction. R. 6294.
2.2

Plaintiffs Cited Fed. Sav. & Loan for the Proposition That a Seller
Directly Participates in Soliciting the Plaintiff's Purchase.

Plaintiffs also objected that Mr. Bloomfield's proposed instruction was factually
misleading, confusing, and prejudicial to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs objected that Mr.
Bloomfield's proposed instruction was "full of information that is so clearly slanted in
Defendants' favor that it would be unduly prejudicial to include it in the instructions to the
jury." R. 6294. Plaintiffs continued with their objection by arguing that the list of factors

Mr. Bloomfield included in his proposed instruction "are completely detached from the
facts of this case. Because none of these factors are factually applicable, a jury may be
confused and believe that the Bloomfield Defendants did not offer or sale the securities to
Plaintiffs because none of these factors are factually relevant." R. 6294.
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Mr. Bloomfield misleadingly claims that Plaintiffs' reference to a federal district
court case, Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Provo Excelsior Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 1405 (D.
Utah 1987) ("Fed. Sav. & Loan"), at the bottom of their proposed jury instruction, means
that Plaintiffs agreed, despite express objections to the contrary, that the list of factors
included in Mr. Bloomfield's proposed instruction were appropriate. See Reply Br. 40
("Plaintiffs cited in support of their proposed instruction the very case they now claim is
the source of the errors.").
This argument is disingenuous, misleading and misconstrues the purpose for which
Plaintiffs cited the case. In Fed Sav. & Loan, the court discussed whether a person was a
seller under federal securities laws. Because the Tenth Circuit had not addressed the issue,
the court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance. In one case analyzed by the Utah
District Court, "the defendants had helped draft the Prospectus, participated in 'road show'
presentations of information to securities brokers and investment analysts, analyzed the
mar~et and set the price of Activision shares, and negotiated the agreement with the
underwriters." See Fed. Sav. & Loan, 664 F. Supp. at 1411 (quoting In re Activision
Securities Litigation, 621 F. Supp. 415, 521 (N.D. Cal. 1985)). Those activities-

participation in road shows, drafting a prospectus, setting the market price-were the
activities Mr. Bloomfield incorporated into his proposed jury instruction as factors the
jurors should consider in deciding whether a person offered or sold a security.
But the Activision court had found those factors irrelevant to a determination of who
was a seller. The Utah District Court noted that the Activision court "distinguished the
above activities from other cases where a defendant had met personally with investors and
{00024676 1 }
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had spoken at broker-dealer seminars." Id The take away from Fed Sav. & Loan is that
the important factor for determining seller liability is whether a defendant met personally
with investors, not whether a defendant engaged in activities such as participating in road
shows, setting the market price, or drafting a prospectus.
Plaintiffs' reference to Federal Sav. & Loan in their proposed jury instruction was
to support the inclusion of the last sentence of Plaintiffs' proposed jury instruction: "For a
person other than the person who actually transfers title in the stock to qualify as a seller
or offeror, that person must actively and directly participate in soliciting a person's
purchase of the security." R 6239.

-~

Compare the last sentence in Plaintiffs' proposed jury instruction to the holding of
the Utah District Court in Federal Sav. & Loan: "we rule that 'seller' status for§ 12(2) will
exist as to the person who transfers title to the stock and such additional persons who
actually and directly participate in soliciting a plaintiffs purchase." Fed. Sav. & Loan, 664
F. Supp. at 1411 The statements are the same. It is clear Plaintiffs cited Federal Sav. &

Loan for its holding and not to support a list of inapplicable factors that Plaintiffs did not
include in their proposed jury instruction and that they objected to in Mr. Bloomfield's
proposed instruction.

2.3

Plaintiffs Did Not Waive Their Objections by Attempting to Ameliorate
the Harm Caused When the District Court Adopted an Errant Jury
Instruction.

Mr. Bloomfield also argues that Plaintiffs did not preserve their objections once the
district court made a modification to the jury instruction that did not remove the offending
list of misleading and irrelevant factors. R. 8865. Once the court had decided to adopt the
{00024676 l }
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erroneous instruction and left all of the offending language in the jury instruction,
Plaintiffs' counsel attempted to ameliorate the harm of the erroneous decision by asking
the court to include additional language in the instruction that the list of misleading and
irrelevant factors should not be given equal weight. R. 8866.
This Court's decisions in similar circumstances support Plaintiffs' counsel's attempt
to ameliorate the damage caused by the trial court's error. For example, this Court has held
that a party does not waive an objection to inadmissible evidence when the objecting party
attempts to ameliorate the damage caused by that evidence during cross-examination. "A
party does not evince a distinct intent to waive his objection to improperly admitted
evidence by attempting to ameliorate the damage caused by that evidence." Wilson v. IHC

Hosps., Inc., 2012 UT 43, ,r 62, 289 P.3d 369. This Court has stated, "It would be unfair
for a prosecutor to question a witness on prohibited information or issues, but then require
the defendant to forego cross-examination, which could ameliorate the damage caused, to
preserve an objection to the prosecutor's misconduct." State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 334
(Utah 1991 ).
Similarly, it would be unfair for this Court to find that Plaintiffs waived their
objections to the inclusion of a misleading and irrelevant list of factors when, after the court
decided to allow the list to be included in the jury instruction, Plaintiffs' counsel suggested
additional language to ameliorate the damage caused by the erroneous instruction.

{00024676 l }
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3.

Jury Instruction 13 was Not a Correct Statement of the Law.

Mr. Bloomfield argues that the inclusion of misleading and irrelevant factors was
not error and, in doing so, continues to misrepresent to the court the holding in Federal
Savings & Loan and Activision. Mr. Bloomfield argues that the factors it included in its

proposed jury instruction were proper because they "were taken directly from Federal Sav.
& Loan." Reply Br. at 48. Mr. Bloomfield points to the fact that Plaintiffs referenced the

case in its proposed jury instructions but fails to explain the holding in the case or explain
why Plaintiffs referenced the case.
3.1

Federal Sav. & Loan Stands for the Proposition that a Seller Is Actively
and Directly Involved in Soliciting a Person's Purchase.

Plaintiffs' reference to Federal Sf!,V. & Loan was to support the inclusion of the last
sentence of Plaintiffs' proposed jury instruction: "For a person other than the person who
actually transfers title in the stock to qualify as a seller or offeror, that person must actively
and directly participate in soliciting a person's purchase of the secwity." R 6239. Plaintiffs
did not reference Federal Sav. & Loan for any other reason but the holding of the case,
which support Plaintiffs' proposed jury instruction.
The factors erroneously included in the jury instruction were found in Federal Sav.
& Loan. But, the Utah District Court found those factors to be irrelevant in determining
seller liability and so did the court in Activision. Moreover, the Federal Sav. & Loan
decision provides no basis to include factors in a jury instruction that have nothing to do
with the facts in the case to be decided by the jury. Mr. Bloomfield's treatment of the
decision in Federal Sav. & Loan is grossly misleading; a review of the holding in the case,

{00024676 1 }
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and the Activision case relied on by the Utah District Court, demonstrate that the factors to
which Plaintiffs objected and to which they object here on appeal are irrelevant to a
determination of whether a person offered or sold a security.
A discussion of the case demonstrates that it cannot support the inclusion of the list
of factors in the jury instruction. Federal Sav. & Loan was a ruling on a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. Federal Savings & Loan was a shareholder of an entity that
agreed to pay the principal of bonds that were issued to pay costs to build a hotel if the
bonds entered default. The bonds went into default and the lawsuit ensued. Federal Savings
& Loan sued, among others, a bank, Mercantile Bank National Association ("Mercantile"),
that acted as a trustee for the bonds and drafted and reviewed documents necessary for the
issuance of the bonds.
Federal Savings & Loan also sued a company, The Marling Group ("Marling"), that
was hired to conduct a market and feasibility analysis for the hotel, which analysis Marling
knew would be used to obtain financing. Federal Savings &- Loan sued both Mercantile
and Marling for violation of§ 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and for violation of the
Utah Securities Act.
Both Mercantile and Marling filed motions to dismiss the claims against them under
12(b)(6) for violation of§ 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and for violation of the Utah
Securities Act for failure to state a claim. The Utah District Court analyzed who could be
a seller under both federal and state securities laws. The court noted that the Tenth Circuit
had not addressed the scope of persons potentially liable for violating§ 12(2) so it looked
to other jurisdictions for guidance.
{00024676 l }
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3.2

The List of Factors Taken from Activision Are Not Determinative of
Whether Someone is a Seller.

The case that the Utah District Court found persuasive was In re Activision. In
Activision, shareholders who purchased shares of stock in a public offering that declined

significantly in value shortly after the public offering, filed claims under§ 12(2) against
corporate officers and directors of Activision, among others. Activision's corporate
officers and directors filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that they were not
sellers of the securities. The allegations against these corporate officers and directors were
that they engaged in some of the conduct which was the conduct included in the list of
factors in Jury Instruction 13 in this case: "planning the offering, drafting the prospectus,
and negotiating the price of the stock." 621 F. Supp. at 420. The court granted the motion
to dismiss, holding that those activities were not relevant to a determination of seller status
because those activities "were merely typical of what any corporation and its officers would
engage in prior to a public offering." Id.
The Activision court granted the shareholders an opportunity to amend their
complaint to provide other allegations to support their claims that the corporate officers
and directors offered or sold securities. The shareholders amended their complaint to allege
that "defendants helped draft the Prospectus, participated in 'road show' presentations of
information to securities brokers and investment analysts, analyzed the market and set the
price for Activision shares, and negotiated the agreement with the underwriters." Id. at 421.
This is the same list of activities that the jury in this case was told they "may"
consider in determining if Mr. Bloomfield was a seller. But the Activision court held that

{00024676 1 }
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even if the defendants engaged in all of those activities, "they are inadequate to impose
liability under 12(2)." Id. . Those activities had no bearing whatsoever on whether the
corporate officers and directors were sellers. In other words, the factors that the district
court instructed the jury here to consider had no factual basis in this case and, in any event,
had been found legally insufficient to determine liability anyway.
The Activision court distinguished cases cited by the shareholders where officers
and directors were found to be sellers because, in those cases, the defendants "met
personally with investors and spoke at broker-dealer seminars." Id. (citing Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980)). Or the defendants
"travelled to Florida to find the original subscribers for the corporation [and] personally
instructed these individuals as to how to solicit additional investors." Id. (citing Hill York
Corp. v. Am. Int'! Fran., Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 692-93 (5th Cir. 1971)).
The court explained that the test to determine seller status "has to be predicated on
actual participation in the selling process." Id. This determination, the court noted, is made
"on a case-by-case basis." Id.
The Activision court granted the corporate officers and directors' second motion to
dismiss because none of the alleged conduct, which was the conduct the trial court told the
jurors the may consider in Jury Instruction 13, were relevant to the determination of seller
liability.

{00024676 I }
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3.3

The Utah District Court's Adoption of the Activision Position Is Not a
Basis for Including the Factors in the Jury Instructions.

The Utah District Court adopted the position taken by the court in Activision that
"seller status has to be predicated on actual participation in the selling process" and noted
that the Activision court "distinguished the above activities [which form the list of factors
included in Jury Instruction 13] from other cases where a defendant had met personally
with investors." Fed. Savings & Loan, 664 F. Supp. at 1411.
The Utah District Court then turned to the alleged conduct of Mercantile and
Marsing. The court noted that the alleged conduct by Mercantile was limited to drafting
and reviewing documents necessary to issue the bonds. Id. at 1412. The court then granted
Mercantile's motion to dismiss because simply drafting and reviewing documents is not
sufficient to show that it directly participated in the sale of securities. Id.
The court also granted Marling's motion to dismiss because the allegation that it
provided professional services to do a market and feasibility analysis was insufficient to
make it a direct solicitor of the purchase of the securities. Id.
3.4

Application of Decisions Cited by Bloomfield to This Case.

In this case, the trial court instructed the jurors that they "may" consider factors that
are not ever applicable in determining whether a person sold securities. The Activision
court held that even if a person engages in all of the activities included in the factors Mr.
Bloomfield inserted into his proposed Jury Instruction, which became Instruction 13, that
person still would not necessarily be considered a seller. These factors cannot be
considered a "guide" to the jury, as Mr. Bloomfield suggests, when none of the conduct
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included in the list of factors can ever, as a matter of law, support a finding of seller
liability. They are also not a "guide" where they are a confusing list of conduct that has
nothing to do with the evidence adduced in the trial the jury attended. The trial court should
have never given permission to the jury to choose to consider a list of factors that, either
individually or in the aggregate, could never support a finding of seller liability.

4.

Plaintiffs Were Harmed by the Jury Instruction.
Plaintiffs were able to present evidence similar to the evidence in State v. Bo/son,

2007 UT App 268, 167 P.3d 539: Mr. Bloomfield approached Plaintiffs with the
investment, Mr. Bloomfield introduced Plaintiffs to the promoter, Mr. Feldman [R. 9219;
9017-18; 9236; 9275-76; 9457; 9868-70]; Mr. Bloomfield helped Plaintiffs determine how
much to invest [R. 9057-58; 9287-91; 9463-64; Tr. Ex. 53; R. 9707-08], Mr. Bloomfield
promised high returns on the investment [R. 9021; 9122-23; 9276; 9401; 9454; 9496;
9721], Mr. Bloomfield received a substantial commission to convince Plaintiffs to invest
[R. 9028-29; 9219-23; 9465; 9496-97; 9245], and Mr. Bloomfield was the Plaintiffs'
primary contact person for information about the investment [R. 9058-59; 9291; 9464;
9280-81]. Based on the foregoing, ajury could have found that Mr. Bloomfield effectuated
_the sale of securities to Plaintiffs. And had the factors and exemptions not been listed in
Jury Instruction No. 13, the jury would have found Defendants liable for selling a security
without a license, which Mr. Bloomfield admitted to at trial. [R.6235.]

{00024676 1 }
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Conclusion On Cross-Appeal
Because the district court erroneously included factually irrelevant factors in Jury
Instruction No. 13, this Court should reverse the judgment on the Securities Claims and
grant Plaintiffs a new trial on those causes of action.

~4D

DATED: May 25, 2017

D.LOWASHBURN

Attorney for Appel/ees and
Cross-Appellants Skyler Witman,
John Washenko, Jonathan
Bonnette, Matt Lovelady, and Don
Jorgensen
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